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The Rise and Fall of the Religion Clauses
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The development of the constitutional law of religion by
the Supreme Court came at the end of a decisive shift in public
values in the United States from Protestantism to secularism.
From the founding era at the end of the 18th century until
early in the 20th century, Protestant religion was thought to be
a significant and legitimate component of American public life.
By the 1940s, however, American public life had become largely
secular, although large numbers of Americans remained
committed to religion in their private lives. The Supreme
Court's recent treatment of the religion clauses can be
understood as the product of the Court's return to the 19th
century relationship between church and state while retaining
the rhetoric of 20th century secularism.

A.

The De Facto Establishment

State religious establishments that existed during the
founding era died a natural political death early in the 19th
century. Even when combined with the establishment clause's
prohibition on national establishments, however, the elimination of state establishments did not lead to a separation of
religion from public life. Nineteenth century Americans understood the Constitution to require separation of church and state
only at the institutional level. This meant that constitutionally
prohibited establishments of religion were created when the
government coerced funding of a particular denomination or

* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. J.D., University of Southern
California. I wish to thank Christine Stone Jepsen for excellent research assistance.
This essay is based on a speech presented at the Brigham Young University Bill of
Rights Symposium in September 1991, and was condensed from an interpretive
essay on "Religion" appearing in the OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (Oxford University Press, 1992).
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conformity to its practices, but it did not require that government or politics be secular. Put a little more simply, 19th century Americans considered government interaction with religion that looked like the old Anglican establishment to be a
constitutionally prohibited establishment of religion. Conversely, if an interaction didn't look like the Anglican establishment,
then it generally wasn't considered an establishment. 1
From shortly after the founding era until early in the 20th
century, church-state relations in the United States were governed by what Mark DeWolfe Howe called the "de facto Protestant establishment."2 The premise of the de facto establishment was that Protestant values were the foundation of civilized society. Accordingly, in public schools teachers led prayers
and included scripture readings from the King James Bible in
their lessons. Customs like legislative prayer became widespread among the states, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter
were officially recognized as holidays, and political rhetoric
made frequent reference to the Almighty. 3 States enforced prohibitions on blasphemy, enforced the Christian Sabbath, and
imposed civil disabilities upon nonProtestants and (especially)
upon nonbelievers. Towards the end of the 19th century, Protestant fundamentalists in many states succeeded in passing
temperance and anti-evolution laws. These same fundamentalists also were instrumental in building political support for the
federal government's efforts in the latter part of the century to
eradicate the Mormon practice of polygamy.
Under the de facto establishment, religious and governmental authority were aligned in a variety of ways, but always
in a diffuse and generally nonsectarian sense. Because the de
jure Anglican establishment of England exemplified for Americans the kind of establishment that was prohibited by the Constitution, the possibility that the more subtle alignments of
religion and government that characterized the de facto establishment were also constitutionally prohibited was never taken
seriously. In the minds of 19th century Americans, the separation of church and state demanded by the establishment clause

1.
THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 191-92 (1986).
2.
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GoVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11-15, ;n, 98 (1965).
3.
MARK TuSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITlJTIONAL LAW 266 (1988).
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was merely institutional. They honored that separation not
only by refraining from establishing a national church, but also
by having abandoned their state religious establishments. Beyond these measures, however, 19th century Americans saw no
need to cabin the public influence of religion. On the contrary,
they saw that influence as being critical to the creation and
maintenance of civilized society. 4

B.

Secular Neutrality

The assumptions of the de facto establishment about the
legitimacy and importance of public religious influence came
under serious pressure early in the 20th century. Exactly how
and why secularization came about is a complex issue. Anumber of influences have been identified, including the growth of
science, Darwin's On the Origin of the Species (1859), the
professionalization of American higher education, and the rise
of legal realism. 5
Whatever its source, secularization has been a powerful
cultural phenomenon in this century. By the 1930s, the socalled "secularization hypothesis" was widely believed by intellectuals and academics in the United States. Under this hypothesis, the progressive secularization of society was seen as
an inevitable and positive long term trend which would eventually end in the elimination of religion as a public influence.
This hypothesis remains controversial but, as Steven Smith has
suggested, it is wholly accurate to conclude that since the end
of World War II, the creation of a "secular society" in the United States has been a genuine political and social option. 6
By the late 1940s, the de facto establishment had become
problematic. Edward Purcell describes how in the 20th century,
religion "emerged as the preeminent symbol of everything that
was bad in human society," whereas science "was inextricably
tied up in the minds of most intellectuals with everything that
was best in human society." 7 Rather than an indispensable
foundation of civilized society, as presupposed by the de facto

4.
See FREDERICK MARK GEDDICK!S & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM:
THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PuBLIC LIFE 41-45 (1991).
5.
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBUjM OF VALUE (1973).

6.

Steven Smith, Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV.

955, 975 (1989).
7.
PuRCELL, supra note 5, at 61.
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establishment, religion had come to be seen as a reactionary
obstacle to secular progress.

II.

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Constitutional litigation under the free exercise clause has
largely centered on whether the clause requires that a person
be excused from complying with laws which contradict that
person's religious beliefs. The constitutionally compelled free
exercise exemption permits believers to ignore any law which
requires them to perform an act which is prohibited by their
religious beliefs, or which prohibits them from performing any
act which is required by their religious beliefs.

A.

The Belief-Action Doctrine

In Reynolds v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court refused
to find a constitutionally compelled exemption for Mormon
polygamists. Under the so-called belief-action doctrine which
the Reynolds Court articulated, government is without constitutional authority to punish a person for his or her religious beliefs, but has full authority to regulate religiously motivated
actions so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Since the
government can always meet this light burden of justification,
the belief-action doctrine effectively forecloses the possibility of
constitutionally compelled exemptions. Accordingly, the beliefaction doctrine enabled state and federal government to regulate and even penalize any religion whose members strayed too
far from the cultural baseline of Protestant piety under the de
facto establishment. 9

B.

The Compelling State Interest Exemption Doctrine

Reynolds' belief-action doctrine was apparently dismantled
by two modern decisions. In Sherbert v. Verner, 10 the Court
ordered a state to pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day
Adventist even though she would not make herself available for
work on Saturday (her Sabbath) as required by the state's unemployment compensation law. The state had argued that
protecting the integrity of the unemployment insurance fund

8.

98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).

9.
PHIUP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW:
THE SUPREME COURT 21-25 (1961).

10.

374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
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against depletion by those who were not really looking for work
was a sufficient reason to deny the benefits (as it probably was
under the rational basis standard of Reynolds). However, the
Supreme Court in Sherbert held that government could burden
a fundamental right like the free exercise of religion only if it
was protecting a compelling interest by the least intrusive
means possible, and found the state's interest insufficient to
justify the infringement. The Court has expressly reaffirmed
this holding on numerous occasions. 11
In the second case, Wisconsin v. Yoder/ 2 the Court held
that the Amish were not required to send their children to
public schools past the eighth grade in violation of their religious beliefs, because the state could not show that its compelling interest would be significantly undermined by granting the
Amish an exemption from compulsory attendance laws. Whereas Sherbert required only that the state justify the law that
burdened free exercise by a compelling interest, Yoder required
that the state justify its denial of an exemption to religious
objectors by a compelling interest. Thus, the effect of Yoder was
to raise substantially the government's burden of justifying any
generally applicable law that incidentally burdened the free
exercise of religion.
Both Sherbert and Yoder are consistent with the Warren
and Burger Courts' respective emphases on individual rights.
Whereas Reynolds clearly assumes that society is more important than the individual, the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine reflects
the view that individual rights are prior to any claims that
society as a whole may make on individual conduct. In terms of
the 19th and 20th century models I have been discussing, the
de facto establishment posited traditional Protestant values as
the basis of society. Those who refused to conform to these
values, like polygamous Mormons, were challenging the very
foundations on which society was thought to be organized, and
thus were not deserving of any relief from laws which burdened
their subversive religious practices. By contrast, a regime of
secular neutrality purports to remain aloof from the choices
that religious Americans make in their private lives. In this
view, the government has no business telling people how to live

11.
E.g, Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. l:-l6 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd, 4fi0 U.S. 707 (1981).
12.
406 U.S. 20fi, 2:14 (1972).
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their moral and religious lives. Accordingly, even idiosyncratic
religious practices that would be considered subversive under
the assumptions of the de facto establishment are protected by
secular neutrality unless they clearly threaten important and
legitimate state interests, which never include enforcement of
private morals.
C.

Erosion of the Sherbert-Yoder Doctrine

When combined with other holdings of the Court, the extraordinary protection of religious exercise afforded by the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine may have created a serious problem. In
United States v. Ballard, 13 the Court had foreclosed judicial
inquiry into the sincerity and reasonableness of religious beliefs. When read with Ballard, the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine
appeared to require that a constitutional exemption from compliance with the law be granted to any religious objector who
asked for one. 14
The mandate of free exercise exemptions that followed
from the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine did not pose a serious difficulty when the benefit to be gained from exemption was something few people would want, like receipt of unemployment
benefits despite being unavailable for work on Saturday, or
freedom from prosecution under compulsory school attendance
laws. In United States v. Lee, 15 however, the Amish asked the
Court to grant them a free exercise exemption from paying
social security taxes. Perhaps fearing a tidal wave of exemption
requests by people claiming that their religious beliefs prevented them from paying any kind of tax at all, 16 the Court
found the government's interest in denying the Amish an exemption to be compelling.
Lee marked the beginning of the end of the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine. After Lee, the Court denied free exercise relief to an
orthodox Jew who sought to wear a yarmulke in violation of
Air Force uniform regulations in Goldman v. Weinberger, 17 a
Native American tribe which sought to prevent construction of

1:1.
14.

:122 U.S. 7H (1944).
William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
ExPrcise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 357, 359 (1990).
15.
4fifi U.S. 252 (1982).

16.

Stephen Pepper, Takinf.i the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.

REV. 299, :124-2fi.
17.
47.~ U.S. fi03 (19H6).
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a highway that would prevent them from worshipping in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 18 and to
a televangelist who objected to state taxation of Bible sales in
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization. 19 Surveying these decisions, Mark Tushnet concluded that the Court
was willing to protect religious exercise only when doing so
either was relatively inexpensive or was otherwise consistent
with secular constitutional norms like freedom of expression or
due process of law. ~
0

D. Abandonment of the Sherbert-Yoder Doctrine
In Employment Division v. Smith, 21 the Court brought
free exercise jurisprudence full circle by reaffirming the beliefaction doctrine of Reynolds. In Smith, a state denied two Native Americans unemployment compensation after they were
dismissed from their jobs for smoking peyote as part of tribal
religious rituals. Because use of peyote was a criminal offense
under state law, the state ruled that the Native Americans had
been dismissed for "work-related misconduct" which permitted
benefits to be withheld. The Native Americans sued for the
benefits, arguing that the free exercise clause prevented the
state from applying the misconduct provision to them.
The Court in Smith effectively abandoned the SherbertYoder doctrine. Noting that denial of unemployment compensation in Sherbert was not based on the plaintiffs commission of
an illegal act, the Court held in Smith that the state's interest
in ensuring the integrity of the unemployment insurance fund
was sufficiently important to justify its refusal to pay benefits
to claimants who were guilty of unlawful conduct. The majority
opinion by Justice Scalia strictly confined Sherbert and its
progeny to their facts, and recast Yoder from a free exercise
opinion that protected freedom of religion into a substantive
due process opinion that protected parental and family autonomy. The opinion expressly stated that the only independent
protection offered by the free exercise clause lay in its prohibition of laws motivated by a desire to disadvantage religion, on
the theory that such laws impose on religious exercise an intentional burden, rather than a merely incidental one. Even this
1R.
19.
20.
21.

4Rfi
49:-l
Sr>r>,
494

U.S. 4:-l~ (1~88).
U.S. :178, :192 (1990).
TUSIINET, supra note
U.S. 872, 8~0 (1990).

a,

at 249.

506

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

protection is redundant of other parts of the Constitution, however, since the Court had already held in Larson u. Valente 22
that legislation demonstrably intended to disadvantage particular religious denominations violates the establishment clause.
Accordingly, Smith left the free exercise clause with no independent content or effect, effectively repealing it.

E.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Smith did approve the legislative practice of writing religious exemptions into laws, a practice which the Court had
previously upheld. 23 Thus, although there is no longer any
such thing as a constitutionally compelled exemption under the
free exercise clause, there still remains a constitutionally permissible exemption under the establishment clause. What this
means is that politically powerful religions will be able to lobby
successfully for exemptions from burdensome legislation in
Congress and the state legislatures, while the free exercise of
politically powerless religions-those most in need of constitutional protection from the majoritarian political process-will
be wholly dependent upon the goodwill of political majorities.
Reynolds and Smith themselves are evidence that politically
powerless religions will often fail to obtain legislative exemptions for their religious practices.
The current controversy over the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Ace 4 is a good example of how majoritarian
politics can intrude upon the interests of minority religions.
The Act is designed to re-establish the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine
by statute. (So the reader can judge my biases, I disclose here
that I am a supporter of the Act and have worked with LDS
Public Communications to generate support for it.) Roman
Catholics are opposing the Act in its present form because
there is a possibility that it could be used to bolster abortion
rights even if Roe v. Wade 25 is overturned. Now, I have generally admired Catholic activism on moral and social issues, but I
can't help but think on this particular issue that if Catholicism
were a minority religion it might give some higher priority to

22.
456 U.S. 228, 25fi (1982).
2a.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 48::! U.S. 327 (1987).
H.R. REP. No. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. REP. No. 2969, 102d
24.
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
25.
410 U.S. 113 (197:1).

1
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the Act. Because Catholics are politically powerful, however,
they can afford to give politics a higher priority than survival.
Those who have relatively little political power, like Mormons,
probably make the calculus differently.
Ill.

A.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Everson and the ((Wall of Separation"

This shift from Protestantism to secularism that I've been
discussing is evident in the Court's first establishment clause
decision in the modern era, Everson v. Board of Education. 26
In Everson, the Supreme Court considered whether a city could
pay for the bus transportation of school-aged children to parochial as well as to public schools. Along the way to holding that
such funding was constitutionally permissible, the Court summarized the principal force behind the drafting of the establishment clause as the desire of the framers to eliminate the civil
disorder and violent persecution that historically had accompanied the establishment of a single sect. Observing that early
American colonials had brought with them the European tradition of the established church, the Court stressed the insult
and indignity of the fact that religious dissenters in America
were compelled to support government churches whose principal aim was "to strengthen and consolidate the established
faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.'m
The Court stated that the establishment clause required an
absolute neutrality on the part of government, both as between
particular religions and as between religion and nonreligion.
The decision closed with a flourish, quoting the Jefferson's nowfamous (or infamous) phrase to the effect that the establishment clause "was intended to erect a 'wall of separation' between Church and State."28
With Everson, the Supreme Court clearly signalled that the
de facto establishment would be abandoned as a guide to the
establishment clause. Although governmental neutrality among
particular Protestant sects was consistent with the de facto
establishment, governmental neutrality between Protestants
and nonProtestants and between believers and atheists was
antithetical to it. Likewise, although the institutional separa-

26.
27.
28.

330 u.s. 1 (1947).
!d. at 10.
!d. at 16.
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tion of church and state was consistent with the de facto establishment, the more decisive political division implied by the
"wall of separation" was not.
Perhaps most important, neutrality and separation both
bespeak a conception of religion that is private and unconnected to government and other institutions of public life. The de
facto establishment was built on the premise that religion is
essential to civilized society. By contrast, the modern requirement that government remain detached and neutral with respect to the religious choices of its citizens suggests that a
wholly secular society is not only possible, but even preferable.
In this view, government can safely remain indifferent about
how religious choice is exercised.

B.

The Erosion of Secular Neutrality

One of the difficulties with secular neutrality is incoherence. It's not too hard to conceptualize a government that is
neutral among religions, but to say that government must be
neutral between religion and nonreligion presents severe conceptual difficulties. What is the position of neutrality between a
proposition A and its negation, not-A? Or, to take an example a
little closer to home, where is the neutral ground between prochoice and pro-life positions on abortion? 29
Of course, the Court's establishment doctrine has never
been genuinely neutral, which is why I have chosen to call it
secular neutrality. The Court proceeds on the modernist assumption that public life is and ought to be secular. Accordingly, it is "neutral" with respect to religion only so long as it remains confined to private life. Religion that manifests itself in
public life is greeted with hostility.
This dichotomy between public secularism and private
religion worked fairly well until the later years of the Burger
Court. By this time, the political composition of the Court had
changed to the point that it was now willing to permit fairly
substantial interactions between religion and government in
public life. However, the Court did not alter its commitment to
secular neutrality as the rhetorical touchstone for constitutionality under the establishment clause. The result was absurd

29.

The Supreme Court seems to have come as close as anyone to articulating

a compromise position in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791

(1992).
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arguments by the Court that actions which seemed indisputably religious were really not religious at all. 30
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 31 for example, the Court approved a
creche or nativity scene which was owned by a city and displayed on city property every Christmas. Chief Justice Burger
argued that because the creche merely celebrated Christmas
and depicted its historical origins, it was a secular display, sort
of like hanging Dali's Last Supper in the National Gallery. 32
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that use of
the creche was secular in that it lent solemnity to an historical
and cultural event. 33
In Bowen v. Kendrick, 34 the Court refused to strike down
a facial establishment clause attack on the Adolescent Family
Life Act, which appropriated funds to social service agencies
who developed programs directed at reducing teenage pregnancy and teen sexual activity in general. A number of religious
social service agencies received funds for programs centered
around abstinence. The Court found that granting funds to
these agencies was not a departure from secular neutrality
because they were not "pervasively sectarian."35
Now, I suppose its true that if one goes into LDS Social
Services, the social welfare arm of the Mormon church, he or
she will not be subjected to the Joseph Smith story, at least not
right away, so in that sense the "sectarianism" of the agency is
not "pervasive." But surely one gets very different counselling
about sexual activity, birth control, pregnancy and adoption at
LDS Social Services than at, say, Planned Parenthood or a
state counselling agency. In fact, I am fully confident that one
gets counselling at Social Services that is consistent with the
LDS faith, and that is probably inconsistent with the most
common secular ways of dealing with teenage sexual activity.
Funding religious as well as secular approaches to this problem
seems to get at neutrality, but remember, it is the commitment
to secular neutrality, rather than neutrality simpliciter, that
puts the Court in the position of having to argue that religious
social service agencies are not really religious.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Tushnet, supra note 3, at 267-68.
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
ld. at 681, 684.
I d. at 687-94.
487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988).
ld. at 624.
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The same sort of dilemma presents itself in Lee v.
Weisman, 36 the case in which the Supreme Court declared
graduation prayer unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court's neutrality analysis virtually dictated the result, although I admit
to being as surprised as anyone by the result. (Again, so that
the reader can judge my biases, I disclose here that I believe
graduation prayer is a bad idea both constitutionally and as a
matter of policy.)
The lower court in Weisman, in a burst of candor, conceded
that the only reason the prayer was prohibited was because it
was addressed to God. In other words, had the rabbi in that
case simply expressed the prayer as his own personal sentiments, no establishment clause issue would have been raised.
In order to preserve secular neutrality while upholding graduation prayer, the Court would have somehow had to characterize
the prayer as secular, which would have generated the same
problems as before, only in much sharper relief-one might be
able to argue that a creche or a social service agency is not pervasively sectarian, but if a prayer isn't sectarian, then what is?
Moreover, the validation of graduation prayer on the theory
that prayer is a secular practice would be an iromc victory
.indeed for religious conservatives. 37
IV.

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

One way of characterizing the evolution of the Court's
religion clause doctrine over the past 100 years is that it has
gone from a weak free exercise and a weak establishment
clause under the de facto establishment, to a strong free exer-

112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
An alternative approach had been advocated by Justice KEnnedy, the author
of the majority opinion in WPisman. In a concurring opinion in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 57::!, 6fifi (19R9) (Kennedy, J., concurring), another creche case,
Kennedy suggested abandoning neutrality for coercion as the rhetorical touchstone
for the establishment clause. In other words, an interaction between religion and
government would not be considered a violation of the establishment clause unless
there was some element of government coercion of religious belief or practice
inherent in the action. Thus, another option for the Court, and the one anticipated
by most commentators, would have been to find that graduation prayers, short and
platitudinous as they typically are, and given in a public ceremonial context with
parents and friends present, are not either actually or potentially coercive. Although Justice Kennedy spent considerable time disc"Ussing the coercive effects of
graduation prayer in Weisman, see 112 S. Ct. at 26.58-2fifil, he explicitly reaffirmed
the Lemon test as the appropriate means of determining constitutionality under the
establishment clause, see 112 S. Ct. at 265fi.
a6.
a7.

499]

THE RELIGION CLAUSES

511

cise and a strong establishment clause under the regime of
secular neutrality, and is now on the way back to a weak free
exercise and a weak establishment clause under the Rehnquist
Court. 38
The Supreme Court has held that federal constitutional
standards are in effect the minimum standards that the states
must adhere to, but that they are free to institute more vigorous protections of individual rights if they so choose. 39 Accordingly, a state which chooses to constitutionalize as a matter of
state law a strong free exercise clause and a strong establishment clause seems free to do so.
What I find interesting is that Utah seems to have such a
constitutional provision already. The language in section 4 is
absolutist for both free exercise and non-establishment
rights. 4 ° Free exercise rights can never be infringed, which
suggests that even compelling state interests may not justify
violations of religious freedom. Moreover, there can be no union
of church and state, or any funding for any religious worship,
or any "domination" or "interference" by a church with respect
to state government. 41
This creates some very interesting interpretive possibilities
with respect to abortion and graduation prayer. If a woman can
persuade a court that her religion requires her as a matter of
conscience to have an abortion in circumstances in which current law does not permit an abortion, then the text of section 4
would seem to require that she be exempted from the law and

38.
Cf Ira C. Lupu, ThP Troublr> With Accomodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743 (1992).
39.
E.f?., PruncYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
See UT. CONST. art. I, § 4:
40.
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for
any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any
person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief
or the absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor
shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any
person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
41.
The legislative history of this provision is contained in OFFICIAL REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 46, 212-51 passim, ::l63-65,
806-07, 1855-72 pat<sim (Star Printing, 1898).
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be permitted to obtain an abortion outside the statutory exceptions. Similarly, if one can show that public prayers in Utah
are virtually always given by LDS people in the LDS style,
then there would seem to be a strong argument that this constitutes interference or domination of the public function by a
particular denomination, or perhaps even the funding of religious worship. Although litigation on both issues is suspended
for the moment in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, one
would expect them to resurface again in some form or another
given the depth of feeling on both sides of both issues.
Now, it is hard for me to believe that Utah state court
judges will interpret those provisions in the way I have described; they have not done so in the past, and contemporary
political realities are simply against it. Nevertheless, these are
live interpretive possibilities, which are likely to become even
more vigorously pressed as the ACLU develops state law arguments in its challenges to restrictive abortion laws and public
prayer. I have no idea how these challenges will turn out, but I
will suggest that the most politically interesting religion clause
controversies of the next few years may be not be centered in
Washington, but in Salt Lake City.

